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I. INTRODUCTION – A SLEEPING GIANT AWAKENS 
It is perhaps the dominant truism of the twenty-first century that has 
awakened China from her slumber to claim the status of a global 
superpower.  In recent years, China has eclipsed Japan as the third 
largest economy, after the United States and the European Union.  China 
is a giant in global trade, with import and exports of goods equal to U.S. 
$3.87 trillion in 2012.1  This means that in 2012, China surpassed the 
United States (U.S. $3.82 trillion) as the biggest trading nation in the 
world in terms of trade volume in goods.  As of 2011, the number of 
China’s middle class exceeded the entire population of the United 
States.2  By 2026, the number of Chinese middle-class citizens will 
reach an estimated 800 million.3  Additionally, according to a 2012 
report, there are now 1,020,000 millionaires in China, defined as those 
with total assets equal to at least U.S. $1.6 million, and 63,500 
individuals with total assets equal to at least U.S. $16 million.4  The 
Hurun Rich List has been tracking China’s tycoons since 1999, and 
reported that the number of U.S. dollar billionaires in China totaled 271 
in 2010, an increase from 130 in 2009.5  The resulting cultural, 
economic, and political turmoil from these and other rapid changes in 
China has been the subject of thousands of popular and scholarly articles 
1.  China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 10, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-become-the-world-s-biggest-
trading-nation.html. 
2.  Helen H. Wang, The Biggest Story of Our Time: The Rise of China’s Middle Class, 
FORBES, Dec. 21, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/helenwang/2011/12/21/the-biggest-story-of-
our-time-the-rise-of-chinas-middle-class/. 
3. Id.
4.  GroupM Knowledge, Hurun Report Together with GroupM Knowledge, HURUN WEALTH 
REPORT 2012, July 31, 2012, http://www.hurun.net/usen/NewsShow.aspx?nid=283. 
5.  Malcolm Moore, China’s Billionaires Double in Number, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7,
2011, 10:52 AM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8746445/Chinas-
billionaires-double-in-number.html. 
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and books.  Surprisingly, throughout the tumult, the Chinese political 
system has remained relatively stable, although not without controversy.  
In the legal academy, one under-studied characteristic of China’s 
stability has been its foreign policy, especially as it plays out in the 
international economic law arena.  This article draws on political 
science, international relations, and the legal literature on global 
governance and coalition-building in order to begin to fill the void. 
For the past ten years, China’s foreign policy has been guided by 
the zealous and consistent pursuit of three “core interests.”6  These core 
interests include: (1) ensuring the permanence of China’s fundamental 
system (including the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party) and 
the maintenance of internal security, (2) protecting state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and (3) the continued economic development and 
stable social order.7  This article highlights the major domestic and 
foreign policy characteristics of each of these three core interests under 
President Hu Jintao’s leadership from 2002 to 2012.  Despite China’s 
recent power transition and the ascendancy of Xi Jinping as head of state 
in 2012 and President in March 2013, no one expects significant changes 
in the broad contours of China’s foreign policy.  Because the three core 
interests will continue to guide Chinese foreign policy in the predictable 
future, it is important to understand the global governance and trade 
policy implications of their unabated salience. 
This article takes an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on 
political science, international relations, and legal global governance 
literatures to explain how China’s foreign policy impacts and guides its 
trade policy, which is manifested in the three core interests.  The article 
makes the case that the core interest analysis holds promising 
explicative, predictive, persuasive, and coalition-building value in the 
arenas of global trade policy and dispute settlement. 
The insight that China pursues its interests in foreign affairs is, of 
course, not new.  All nations do.8  However, two factors make the 
analysis advanced in this article useful and timely.  There is a critical 
6.  See Wang Jisi, China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its
Way, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 71 (2011) (arguing that China’s pursues sovereignty, security and 
development simultaneously). 
7.  首轮中美经济对话:除上月球外主要问题均已谈, 中新社 [Talks Begin at the First
China-U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue], July 28, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/ 
news/2009/07-29/1794984.shtml (reporting on comments by State Councilor Dai Bingguo at the 
first China-U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue in Washington, D.C., in July 2009). 
8.  ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWERS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 7-16 (1989) (coining the term “neoliberal institutionalism” 
and distinguishing this from other interest-based international relations theories). 
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difference in the temporal scope of policy changes between China and 
other countries, especially other superpowers.  Take the United States 
for example.  One can point to a distinct foreign policy shift between the 
administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. 
Commentators disagree on the exact degree of the change,9 but few 
would allege that there was no policy change.10  In contrast, China’s 
foreign policy has remained remarkably consistent for ten years – and 
these were ten years characterized by rapid social change, intense 
economic change, and seismic cultural shifts in other arenas of Chinese 
life. Yet China’s foreign policy goals remained unchanged.  Even more 
strikingly, it is likely to remain fundamentally unchanged for at least 
another decade.  The only foreseeable change is that China will pursue 
the three core interests even more actively.11 
While political scientists and international relations scholars are 
used to interest-based discourse, such discourse is often missing in the 
legal literature.  Moreover, the intersection between the three disciplines 
(political science, international relations, and law) is under-theorized.  
Thus, this article makes a much-needed contribution to the 
interdisciplinary literature on China. 
Understanding how China perceives and pursues its core interests is 
critical and important in four distinct, but related, ways.  First, China’s 
past behavior is a predictor of future behavior.  This is true both in 
domestic policy and foreign policy (see Part II).  Second, in the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) arena, applying the core interest analysis 
helps us predict what cases China will file or prosecute as well as what 
cases we can expect China to defend most zealously (see Part III.B’s 
case study).  Third, the core interests’ analysis yields insight on China’s 
future role in coalition and alliance-building attempts, which are 
especially important for smaller developing countries.  Armed with this 
information, these countries can better frame their coalition building or 
negotiations strategies to appeal to China’s interests.  In other words, 
understanding the core interests and how they play out in WTO litigation 
will help countries predict areas in which China will likely be an ally. 
Where China’s core interests are not implicated, China is unlikely to 
lend a helping hand.  Lastly, this real-politik understanding exposes one 
9.  Brett McGurk, Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose
Consensus This Time, FOREIGN AFF., June 21, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67957/ 
brett-mcgurk/agreeing-on-afghanistan. 
10.  See generally Barack Obama, Essay: Renewing American Leadership, FOREIGN AFF.
(July/Aug. 2007). 
11.  See Jisi, supra note 6, at 71.
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of the remaining weaknesses of the WTO system, in which small 
economies are still held hostage to power politics.  This last observation 
leads to significant implications for international global governance that 
is elaborated in detail in Part V. 
This article proceeds in five main parts.  Part II traces the contours 
of China’s three core interests in action, both in the domestic and 
international spheres.  While not purporting to be exhaustive, it takes 
some of the most significant events in China’s recent history and 
examines them through the core interest lens.  This section provides a 
deeper understanding of China’s motives by embedding them in the 
context of geopolitical goals and policies.  Part III focuses the lens more 
narrowly on the arena of international trade law.  It examines the 
ongoing U.S.-China and E.U.-China trade disputes on solar subsidies in 
terms of a core interest analysis.  This section provides a useful roadmap 
for understanding future cases.  It demonstrates that China engages in a 
deliberate and intentional weighing of how WTO litigation and other 
activities advance or impede its strategic interests.  Part IV examines the 
policy and normative implications of these finding with an 
interdisciplinary analysis drawing on political science, international 
relations, and legal global governance literatures.  Part V lays out the 
four significant implications to be drawn from this article’s arguments, 
briefly described in the paragraph above.  Part VI concludes. 
II. PURSUIT OF CORE INTERESTS
For the past ten years, three core interests have been the driving 
engines of China’s foreign policy.  These core interests are: (1) ensuring 
the permanence of China’s governing system and the maintenance of 
internal security, (2) protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and (3) the continued economic development and stable social order.  
Each of these three core interests present significant global governance 
implications in the area of both foreign and trade policy.  This section 
traces the origins and contours of each of the three core interests. 
A. Overview of China’s Foreign Policy and Core Interests 
Thanks to China’s tight one-party rule, its foreign policy tends to be 
relatively consistent over time.  During the presidency of Deng Xiaoping 
(1992 to 1997), China was widely perceived as “passive”12 in the foreign 
12.  See Evan S. Medeiros & M. Taylor Fravel, China’s New Diplomacy, 82 FOREIGN AFF.
22, 23 (2003) (arguing that China’s passivity in foreign diplomacy began to change with Beijing’s 
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policy sphere.  The policy has been described as “rhetorically promoting 
a ‘peaceful international environment’ in which to grow their economy 
while free-riding on the tough diplomatic work of others.”13  As a rule, it 
played a quiet role in international forums such as the United Nations 
(“UN”), where despite its seat on the Security Council, it rarely claimed 
the spotlight, preferring to operate in the shadows whenever its interests 
were implicated.14  While other nations certainly also operate informally 
in back rooms (at the UN or elsewhere), China stands out for the rarity 
with which it has proclaimed any public positions.15  China has also 
eschewed important leadership roles in important multinational 
negotiations, such as the Kyoto Agreement on Climate Change.16  While 
China insisted on treatment as a developing nation, it left the advocacy 
for the implications of such a label to others like India and Brazil.17  
During this time, China was not active at the International Court of 
Justice – participating for the first time only in 2009 in an advisory 
hearing on Kosovo.18  It did actively pursue membership in the WTO19 
as well as negotiate a number of key bilateral trade agreements,20 
facilitation of three party talks in 2003 over North Korea’s nuclear policies). 
13.  See Elizabeth C. Economy, The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy
Revolution, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 142, 142 (2010). 
14.  Jorge G. Castañeda, Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the
Helm Would Hurt Global Governance, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 109, 111 (2010) (arguing that Brazil, 
China, India, and South Africa are not ready to join the helm.  Their shaky commitment to 
democracy, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and environmental protection would only 
weaken the international system’s core values). 
15.  China and Qatar Block Security Council Statement on Darfur Crimes, SUDAN TRIBUNE,
Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25104. 
16.  For example, the United States justified its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on the
ground that the Protocol incorporated the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,” 
leaving China, India, and other developing countries without any significant responsibility for 
emissions reductions.  See Por Thilo Kunzemann, The Past and Future of the Kyoto Protocol, 
ALLIANZ, Nov. 27, 2011, http://sustentabilidade.allianz.com.br/?131 (stating that U.S. politicians 
were angered by the fact that the Kyoto Protocol gave major economic competitors a “free ride”).  
Canada echoed these complaints when it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol at the Durban 
conference.  See Canada to Withdraw from Kyoto Protocol, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:01 AM), 
http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16151310.  The Chinese delegation at Durban 
“accused developed countries of hypocrisy.”  See, e.g., John M. Broder, Climate Talks in Durban 
Yield Limited Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, at A9; see also Roger Harrabin, UN Climate 
Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise Compensation, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018. 
17.  See Castañeda, supra note 14, at 118. 
18.  Dapo Akande, Is China Changing Its View of International Tribunals? EJIL: TALK! (Oct.
4, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-china-changing-its-view-of-international-tribunals/. 
19.  See DEEPAK BHATTASALI ET AL, EDS., CHINA AND THE WTO: ACCESSION, POLICY
REFORM, AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 1 (World Bank ed. 2004). 
20.  MOFCOM, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.
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although both were seen as critical to China’s economic development.  
Overall, commentators have described China’s foreign policy under 
Deng as maintaining the status quo.21 
Deng oversaw the beginnings of China’s great economic expansion, 
but it was under Hu Jintao’s leadership that China’s economy flowered. 
Hu Jintao presided over China’s phenomenal rise as a global economic 
power in just ten years.  China’s economy has grown steadily since 
2002, dipping only temporarily in the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial crisis.22  This sustained growth ushered in a marked increase in 
China’s willingness to assert its newfound economic clout in foreign 
affairs.  One observes three distinct but related trends under Hu.  First, 
Hu abandoned Deng’s low-profile diplomacy in favor of more assertive, 
even aggressive, stances.  Second, Hu sought to elevate China’s global 
leadership and geopolitical position via foreign policy.  Third, China 
showed increased readiness to undertake a stronger role in international 
governance befitting its new status as a rising power.  China’s leaders 
now recognize that fulfilling their domestic needs of economic growth 
demands a more activist global strategy.23 
Each of these trends developed in tandem with China’s pursuit of 
three core interests.  Not only was the Chinese leadership increasingly 
assertive in defense of the core national interests, but so were the 
Chinese people.  Both reacted, on occasion, quite stridently to perceived 
slights to its national pride and sovereignty.  A nationalist rhetoric 
emerged, and took strong root.  A recent example occurred in 2012 when 
the Chinese government tacitly sanctioned anti-Japanese populist 
protests over Japan’s alleged purchase and nationalization of the hotly 
contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.24  Another 
increasingly common symptom of the same phenomenon is China’s 
insistence on serving as a counterpoint to American hegemony,25 not 
only in Asia, but in other parts of the world as well, especially in 
Africa.26  These issues are laden with symbolic value tied to China’s 
21.  See Economy, supra note 13, at 142. 
22.  Rising Power, Anxious State, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/18829149. 
23.  See Economy, supra note 13, at 142. 
24.  CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA’S 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 26 (RoutledgeCurzon 2004). 
25.  Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s
Fears, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 42, 44 (2012). 
26. Leslie Hook & Katrina Manson, China Pledges More Investments to Africa, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 25, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2bc930e-9517-11e2-
a4fa-00144feabdc0.html#slide0. 
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prestige and sense of national pride. 
B. Internal State Security and Communist Party Rule 
The Chinese Communist Party has ruled China since October 1, 
1949 when Mao Zedong formally announced the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China.27  In no other country has a single “political 
party” been in power for so long in modern history.  Even though China 
has seen tremendous change and political turmoil since 1949, the 
Communist Party has been surprisingly resilient through it all.  It 
survived Mao’s ill-fated Great Leap Forward and the starvation of 
millions of Chinese,28 the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the destructive 
Cultural Revolution,29 and the tragedy of Tiananmen Square.30  More 
recently, the Communist Party has survived countless internal and 
external attacks on China’s human rights abuses, widespread populist 
unrest over rural land seizures, the deep social rifts caused by 
urbanization, and a society increasingly characterized by huge wealth 
disparity.  How has it survived? 
The Chinese government spends a staggering amount on internal 
state security every year.  China devoted U.S. $111 billion in 2012,31 and 
more in 2013,32 to internal state security.  This amount comprises 
spending for police, state security, armed militia, courts and jails, and 
other items it categorizes as “public security.”33  It spends more on its 
massive internal security apparatus than on its military.34  Much of this 
public security spending goes to maintaining the hold of the Communist 
Party, thus explaining the long-term survival of one-party rule in China 
27.  JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 512-15 (1990).
28.  YANG JISHENG ET AL, TOMBSTONE: THE GREAT CHINESE FAMINE, 1958-1962 XXII,
XXIII (Edward Friedman et al. eds., Stacy Mosher & Guo Jian, trans. 2012). 
29.  JOSEPH ESHERICK ET AL, EDS., THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY 1
(Joseph W. Esherick et al. eds., 2006). 
30.  DINGXIN ZHAO, THE POWER OF TIANANMEN: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND THE 1989 
BEIJING STUDENT MOVEMENT 1-2 (2004). 
31.  China Domestic Security Spending Rises to $111 Billion, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:06
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/us-china-parliament-security-idUSTRE82403J 
20120305; See also generally Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 303 (2004). 
32.  Ben Blanchard & John Ruwitch, China Hikes Defense Budget, to Spend More on Internal
Security, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 20133:49 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-china-
parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305. 
33.  See China Domestic Security, supra note 31. 
34.  Keith B. Richburg, China Military Spending to Top $100 Billion in 2012, Alarming
Neighbors, WASH. POST March 4, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-
04/world/35448587_1_path-of-peaceful-development-official-military-budget-first-aircraft-carrier. 
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despite cataclysmic changes. 
C. State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity 
China has been increasingly willing to assert its state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.  China’s policies in Tibet and the South China 
Sea are illustrative of the lengths to which China will go to defend this 
core interest.35 
Tibet.  In response to President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai 
Lama in early 2010, China reminded the West of the tough statement 
that Deng once made, “[n]o one should expect China to swallow the 
bitter [fruit] that [hurts its interest].”36  This aggressive rhetoric is a 
departure from China’s usual measured tones vis-à-vis Tibet.  Moreover, 
China stepped up an overt and aggressive policy of cultural assimilation, 
encouraging the migration of thousands of ethnic Han Chinese into 
Tibet.37  China has not retreated from its aggressive policies and rhetoric 
in Tibet. 
South China Sea.  In its relations with Asian-Pacific neighbors, 
Beijing has been aggressive in maritime territorial disputes.  China has 
long coveted the resource-rich islands in the South China Sea.38  For 
many decades, China pursued a delaying strategy and avoided both 
shows of force and escalation.  During the last three years of the Hu 
presidency, China began to overtly and aggressively assert sovereignty 
over the disputed maritime territories.39  In 2009, it even publically 
extended its official territorial integrity claims beyond the traditional 
areas of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang40 to include maritime territorial 
claims over much of the South China Sea. 
Three recent events, all occurring between 2009 and 2012, illustrate 
the trend of China’s pro-activity in the South China Sea.  Beginning in 
2009, China made repeated diplomatic and military attempts to prevent 
Vietnamese and Philippine vessels from exploring oil and gas in 
disputed waters of the South China Sea.41  In 2010, China took punitive 
35.  Taiwan is discussed infra in Part II.A.
36.  Press Conference of the PRC State Council Information Office for Contacts Between
Central Government and Dalai Lama, XINHUA (Feb. 11, 2010, 2:03 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-02/11/c_13172224.htm. 
37.  Edward Wong, China’s Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
38.  See CHUNG, supra note 24, at 9. 
39.  Id.
40.  Wu Xinbo, Forging Sino-US Partnership in the Twenty-First Century: Opportunities and
Challenges, J. CONTEMP. CHINA 21:75, 391, 393 (2012). 
41.  Jane Perlez, Dispute Flares Over Energy in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 4,
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action by breaking off diplomatic contacts with Japan over Japan’s 
detention of a Chinese trawler captain who strayed into Japanese 
territorial waters.42  Lastly, in 2012, the Japanese government decided to 
nationalize the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea 
by purchasing them from a private seller, which set off a furor.43  
Chinese public outrage against Japan ran high, resulting in widespread 
protests and looting aimed at Japanese businesses.  For example, crowds 
of angry protesters shut down a factory in China in 2012.44  In each of 
these incidents, China brought into play its naval superiority, flexing its 
muscles in a manner reminiscent of war games in the China/Taiwan 
Formosa Strait, but rarely seen elsewhere.  Each of the three incidents 
led to diplomatic crises, in addition to nadirs in China’s relationship with 
its neighbors. 
D. Economic Development and Social Stability 
The story of China’s astonishing economic success is inextricably 
linked to the success of the Chinese Communist Party.  Since Deng’s 
economic reforms, the Party has tied its fate to continued economic 
growth, largely driven by an export-oriented economy.  The Communist 
Party has staked its legitimacy on its ability to sustain economic growth.  
Some commentators have noted that the Chinese Communist Party 
pursues economic growth as if its life depended on it, which may well be 
true.45 
China’s rapid economic expansion has lifted millions out of poverty 
and created a hitherto unknown middle class.  But it has come at a great 
cost.  Just to name a few of the problems that China faces that make the 
headlines in and out of China regularly: environmental degradation,46 
scarcity in natural resources,47 corruption,48 social upheaval,49 public 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/world/asia/china-vietnam-and-india-fight-over-energy-
exploration-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0. 
42.  Yuri Kageyama, Chinese Boat Skipper Arrested Off Japan’s Coast, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 7, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/chinese-boat-skipper-arrested-off-japans-coast-
010649940.html. 
43.  Panasonic, Toyota Report Damages in China as Protests Widen, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16,
2012, 5:34 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-16/panasonic-plant-in-china-on-fire-as-
anti-japan-protests-escalate.html. 
44.  Id.
45.  JOHN KNIGHT & SAI DING, CHINA’S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH 295 (2012). 
46.  Damien Ma, Before and After Hu: Is China Better Off Than It Was Ten Years Ago?,
FOREIGN AFF. 2-3 (2012). 
47.  Id.
48.  Eric X. Li, The Life of the Party: The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China, 92
FOREIGN AFF. 34, 39 (2013). 
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health crises,50 wealth disparity,51 and erosion of traditional values52 
(such as caring for the elderly, who are now often abandoned in the 
country by their children who work in cities).  These myriad problems 
explain in part why China spends so much on maintaining internal 
security.  Another key element of the social stability equation is the rise 
of a large politically savvy and active middle class.  Increasingly, this 
new middle class desires not only the economic privileges of their 
counterparts in the West, but also their social and political freedoms.  
Until now, there has been a silent détente, with the middle class staying 
relatively quiescent in exchange for the direct benefit of continued 
economic gains.  However, how much longer can the détente last? 
III. CORE INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
This section considers how China’s three core interests find 
expression in its trade policies.  The section proceeds in two parts.  First, 
it provides illustrations of how China’s trade policy links up to the three 
core interests.  Second, it explores how each of the three core interests 
has found expression in international economic law litigation, seen 
through the lens of domestic and WTO trade remedies cases.  In 
particular, the ongoing dispute between the United States and China over 
solar energy subsidies illustrates how deeply the core interests are 
intermeshed with trade policies.  This section also considers China’s 
other major WTO cases, arguing that each of the central cases China has 
either brought or the strategy chosen to defend a case are driven, in 
whole or in part, by the furtherance of one of the three core interests. 
A. Linkages Between Regional East Asian Trade Policy and Core 
Interests 
All countries align foreign and domestic policies with trade policy, 
although views on the extent of alignment or even the desirability of 
alignment may vary.53  One common integration principle is that foreign 
49.  John W. Schoen, China’s Wealth Gap Strains Social Fabric, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 20,
2010, 10:36 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39546204/. 
50.  Yanzhong Huang, The Sick Man of Asia: China’s Health Crisis, 10 FOREIGN AFF. 119,
124 (2011). 
51.  See Ma, supra note 46, at 2-3.
52.  Benjamin Cost, China’s Aging Population Poses Problems for Economy and Tradition,
SHANGHAIIST (Mar. 22, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://shanghaiist.com/2012/03/22/chinas_aging_ 
population.php. 
53.  See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé?, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES,
Fall 1987, at 131-44, cited in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
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and domestic policy goals must be balanced with the desire to maintain 
friendly trade relations with existing trading partners or open up trade 
opportunities with new partners.  For example, Country A’s decision to 
host a formal state visit from Country B may be driven, in part, by a 
desire to trade more with Country B.  Similarly, the value of making 
condemnatory statements on Country C’s human rights record may be 
balanced against the desire to maintain friendly trade relations with 
Country C.  The interlinked nature of decisions makes it difficult to 
distill a single motive behind each decision.  Nonetheless, it is possible 
to discern trends in the salience of one among many motives in the 
conduct of foreign affairs.  In the past ten years, one can identify a 
cohesive trend of increased assertion of China’s core interests. 
Taiwan is a particularly salient example of the close relationship 
between Chinese foreign policy objectives and trade policy.  China’s 
insistence on the One-China policy is a cornerstone of its sovereignty 
core interest.  As a result of the One-China policy, Taiwan’s status as a 
member of the community of nations is fraught with confusion.  Taiwan 
has struggled to carve out a policy space for itself because of its 
ambiguous status in international law.  Due to China’s strong-arming, 
just twenty-five nations have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.54  
The lack of official diplomatic recognition also hampers Taiwan’s trade 
relations.  Taiwan is party to only five free trade agreements: El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Panama.55  In contrast, 
China has fourteen free trade agreement partners comprised of thirty-one 
economies56 and is actively negotiating many more, in addition to 
investment treaties.57  Interestingly, Taiwan is a member of the WTO, 
but only through a protracted negotiated compromise reached during 
China’s accession process where the two nations raced to the finish line 
for WTO membership, with China joining on December 11, 200158 and 
Taiwan soon thereafter on January 1, 2002.59  Taiwan feared that if 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 24-29 (4th ed. 2003). 
54.  Diplomatic Allies, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Regions/AlliesIndex/?opno=f8505044-f8dd-4fc9-b5b5-
0da9d549c979. 
55.  See FTAs Signed with Trading Partners, BUREAU OF FOREIGN TRADE,
http://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=672. 
56.  MOFCOM, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.
57.  For an analysis of China’s evolving investment treaty program, see generally Stephan W.
Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s 
Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 (2007). 
58.  See Member Information – China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm. 
59.  See Member Information – Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
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China were to become a WTO member first, it would vote to block 
Taiwan’s membership.  Thus, Taiwan felt it had no choice but to 
negotiate quickly to join the WTO at the same time as China.  In 
exchange for a speedy accession process, Taiwan agreed to join as a 
developed nation and made other costly concessions.60 
In the South China Sea, China’s sovereignty claims come into 
direct conflict with its trade interests in the area.  China’s recent 
relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) 
and the East Asia Free Trade Area have deteriorated substantially in 
recent years due to territorial claims in the South China Sea.  The dispute 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is just the most recent and highly 
publicized episode.  The South China Sea links the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans and has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.  Several 
Asian countries claim sovereignty over the South China Sea, whose 
waters are believed to be rich in oil and gas.  China claims virtually the 
entire sea, while the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia 
claim various parts.61  China’s aggressive military policing of the South 
China Sea raised tensions with its neighbors to new peaks throughout 
2012.  The crisis has not abated.  New rules that came into effect on 
January 1, 2013, allow police in the southern Chinese province of 
Hainan to board and seize control of foreign ships that “illegally enter” 
Chinese waters and order them to change course.62  In November 2013, 
tensions rose over China’s patrolling of a newly declared air zone over 
the disputed South China Sea Islands.63 
Meanwhile, China is supposedly working on closer economic 
integration with the very same countries whose territorial claims it 
disputes in the South China Sea.  In the background are China’s ongoing 
efforts to foster a closer economic partnership with ASEAN, particularly 
through the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation initiative in which China, 
Japan, and South Korean pledge to work closely with ASEAN’s 
members on a wide range of trade, development, economic, and social 
Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm. 
60.  See Lee J. Brenner, The Effect of China’s WTO Accession on Taiwan, 
LEEJBRENNER.COM, http://www.leejbrenner.com/The_Effect_of_China%27s_WTO_.html. 
61.  Matthew Bigg, ASEAN Chief Says China Plan on Disputed Seas Escalates Tension,
REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2012, 2:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/us-china-seas-
asean-idUSBRE8AT09120121130. 
62.  Id.
63.  Jane Perlez & Martin Fackler, China Patrols Air Zone Over Disputed Islands, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/world/asia/japan-south-korea-fly-
military-planes-in-zone-set-by-china.html?_r=0. 
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issues.64  Progress on the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation plan has 
stalled largely due to tensions in the South China Sea.  The same is true 
for the East Asia Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”), encompassing the 
same ASEAN Plus Three membership.  An East Asian FTA would have 
economic benefits (as well as disadvantages and displacement events), 
but would also foster closer regional interdependence, leading to 
possible reductions of social and political tensions.65  However, there is 
little forward movement with ASEAN due to China’s aggressive policies 
in the South China Sea, policies that have entrenched the rivalry between 
China and Japan.  Leadership and cooperation between China and Japan 
would be necessary for the creation of an East Asia FTA, but the two 
countries have rival and divergent views on regional security.  China 
stands to gain a great deal from an East Asia FTA,66 particularly in new 
potential export markets.  However, the core interest of continued 
economic development is pitted against the competing interests of 
regional hegemony, control over valuable resources (oil and gas reserves 
in the South China Sea, also essential for economic development), and 
territorial sovereignty.  It is not surprising that cooperation with ASEAN 
is getting short shrift. 
Particularly in regional politics, trade relations are reflective of and 
even subservient to regional hegemonic and sovereignty concerns. 
China’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and its ASEAN neighbors in the South 
China Sea are explicable only in terms of core interests of sovereignty 
and regional hegemonic dominance.  This can also be understood in 
terms of China’s need to maintain internal stability by aggressively 
pursuing alternative sources of energy to fuel its economic expansion.  
The next section explores how core interests play out in trade disputes in 
light of these core interests. 
B. Case Study – Solar Industry Trade Dispute 
The solar energy industry presents a timely and salient case study 
of how China’s core interests can place China on a political and 
economic collision course with its largest trading partners - the United 
States and the European Union.  China has been investing very heavily 
in the solar industry, both privately and publically, through government 
64.  See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation,
ASEAN.ORG (OCT. 23, 2012), http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/asean-
plus-three-cooperation. 
65.  Shujiro Urata, Towards an East Asia Free Trade Area, OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE 
POLICY INSIGHTS, 4 http://www.oecd.org/dev/31098183.pdf. 
66.  Id. at 4.
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subsidies, loans, and other policies.  The solar industry is an important 
cornerstone of China’s export-driven economic growth policy, as well as 
its desire to have sustainable sources to satisfy its ever-increasing 
domestic energy demand.  Increased demand for energy and other 
resources presents a tinderbox of social stability issues for the Chinese 
government, pressured to respond to skyrocketing demand for resources.  
Thus, the solar industry provides a direct lens into two core Chinese 
interests – economic growth through export expansion and maintaining 
domestic social stability. 
1. Brief Overview of Renewable Energy Investments
Renewable energy now comprises a significant portion of global 
investment in the energy industry.  In 2011, 16.7 percent of all global 
energy investment went toward renewable energy.67  The United Nations 
reported that investment in renewable energy reached a record U.S. $257 
billion in 2011, representing a 17 percent increase from 2010.68  In 2012, 
China was responsible for one-fifth of all investments in renewable 
energy, spending U.S. $52 billion, slightly topping the United States’ 
share of U.S. $51 billion.69  Germany, Italy, and India comprise the next 
top tier of countries making large renewable energy investments.70  Solar 
and wind made up 8.2 percent of global investment in renewables.71  
Renewable energy supplies only 4.7 percent of the world’s electricity,72 
so there is great growth potential for industry.  The level of investment 
means the solar energy industry may be poised for extraordinary growth.  
In 2011, solar led the renewable energy industry with U.S. $147 billion 
in global investment.73 
Solar energy’s impressive growth is due its increasing viability as 
an economically efficient energy source.  Enough sunlight hits the Earth 
in one hour to power the world’s energy needs for an entire year.74  A 
plot of solar panels covering an area of 100 miles by 100 miles would 
67.  See Jack Perkowski, China Leads the World in Renewable Energy Investment, FORBES






72.  Renewable Power, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2013/review-by-energy-type/renewable-energy/renewable-power-.html. 
73.  Perkowski, supra note 67. 
74.  Jeff Himmelman, The Secret to Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/the-secret-to-solar-power.html?pagewanted=all. 
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power the United States for a day.75  Of course, much of the potential is 
not practically harvestable, but investors are beginning to appreciate 
solar energy’s potential.76  Consumers are also embracing solar energy.  
More consumers are installing solar panels worldwide.  In the United 
States, companies have discovered the best way to market solar energy 
for commercial and residential use is through leasing solar panels,77 
reaping more profits for the company and savings for the consumer.78  
This new approach coupled with state and local incentives (such as 
significant rebates) have boosted both consumer demand and investment 
in solar power.79 
2. U.S. Solar Industry
In 2010, the United States consumed 8 percent of its energy from 
renewables. Of the renewable energy, solar energy comprised only 1 
percent.80  Nonetheless, solar power demand has grown quickly as the 
price of solar panels in the United States decreased from $50 per watt in 
1975 to 84 cents per watt in 2012, a 97.2 percent drop.81  The Wall 
Street Journal reports, “the U.S. is on pace to install as much solar power 
this year as it did in this century’s entire first decade: at least 2,500 
megawatts, the equivalent of more than two nuclear-power plants.”82  
Many of these solar panels, however, will come from foreign companies.  
“[Photovoltaic] imports have been rising for several reasons: (1) 
increasing crystalline silicon (c-Si) module production in places like 
China, Malaysia, and the Philippines; (2) an emergent U.S. market, 
responding to the falling price of solar energy; and (3) favorable state 





79.  The State of Colorado, for instance, has programs that offer rebates and payments that
cover 20 percent to 30 percent of a given solar system’s costs, including installation. Combined with 
a 30 percent federal tax credit available to all Americans, a consumer could potentially subsidize 
more than 50 percent of the costs. Colorado Solar Incentives, WHOLESALE SOLAR, (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.wholesalesolar.com/solarincentives/Coloradosolarpanels.html. 
80.  Renewable & Alternative Fuels: Trends in Renewable Energy Consumption and
Electricity, EIA (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/renewable/annual/trends/. 
81.  Ryan Tracy & Cassandra Sweet, Fueled by Cheap Chinese Panels, U.S. Solar Use Soars,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443589304 
577637333545350176.html. 
82.  Id.
83.  MICHAELA D. PLATZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42509, U.S. SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC
MANUFACTURING: INDUSTRY TRENDS, GLOBAL COMPETITION, FEDERAL SUPPORT 19 (2012). 
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solar panels imported in the U.S. come from Asia.84  China accounts for 
56 percent of all imports into the United States.85 
3. China’s Solar Industry
China is the second largest economy in the world, but the biggest 
consumer of energy. China now accounts for 21 percent of all global 
energy consumption – greater than even the United States (see Figure 1 
below).86 
Source: Mamta Badkar, The Ultimate Guide to China’s Voracious Energy 
Use, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2012, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-energy-use-2012-8?op=1. 
China’s energy use increased 150 percent in the past decade, and 
although per capita energy use remains small relative to the United 
States, its growing middle class and surging economic development 
means that per capita use will continue to rise.87  Of all renewable 
energies, including hydropower, solar energy comprises only 1 percent 
of renewable energy use in China.88 
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
86.  Mamta Badkar, The Ultimate Guide to China’s Voracious Energy Use, BUSINESS 
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Renewable energy, especially solar, thus comprises a tiny portion 
of China’s energy portfolio.  However, China is investing heavily in 
renewable energy.  In 2012, China was responsible for one-fifth of all 
investment in renewable energy, spending U.S. $52 billion, compared 
with the United States at U.S. $51 billion.89  China intends to spend an 
additional U.S. $457 billion over the next five years and has set a goal to 
consume 20 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020.90  
U.S. $39.5 billion will be invested in the solar energy industry alone in 
2015.91  Moreover, “China’s official goal is to install 10 gigawatts of 
solar panels a year by 2015, using 20-year contracts to guarantee 
payment for electricity purchased from them.”92 
China’s ability to manufacture solar panels is tremendous.  GTM 
Research, a renewable energy consulting firm in Boston, estimated that 
in 2012 Chinese companies had the ability to manufacture 50 gigawatts 
of solar panels per year, while the Chinese domestic market was on track 
to absorb only four to five gigawatts.93 
China currently exports 95 percent of all the solar panels it 
produces.94  However, the proportion of solar panel exported will likely 
decline as domestic consumption expands.95  China supplied half of the 
world’s solar panels in 2012, an increase from one-fifth in 2008, making 
it the largest producer in the world.96  By comparison, the United States 
exported only three percent of the world’s solar panels in 2012, down 
from seven percent in 2008.97  China’s aggressive pursuit of export 
markets for solar panels has placed it on a collision course with both the 
United States and the European Union. 
89.  Perkowski, supra note 67. 
90.  PLATZER, supra note 83, at 17. 
91.  Jamie Yap, China’s Solar Power Investment to Hit $39.5B by 2015, ZDNET (Sept. 14,
2012, 5:27 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/cn/chinas-solar-power-investment-to-hit-39-5b-by-2015-
7000004255/. 





94.  John Mathews, Solar Panels in China: An Emerging U.S.-China Trade Dispute? THE 
GLOBALIST (Jan. 19, 2012) http://www.theglobalist.com/solar-panels-in-china-an-emerging-u-s-
china-trade-dispute/. 
95. See PLATZER, supra note 83. 
96.  Tracy & Sweet, supra note 81; Leslie Hook, Cloud Hovers Over China’s Solar Industry, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bef02db6-1c26-11e2-a63b-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2CVY9wR9l. 
97.  Tracy & Sweet, supra note 81. 
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4. Financial Hard Times for the Solar Industry
Despite positive growth and massive production capacity, the solar 
energy industry has fallen on hard times.  The influx of Chinese solar 
panels onto the world market has created an oversupply that vastly 
outstrips demand by almost twofold.98  This oversupply has caused a 
precipitous decline in prices, hurting solar panel companies around the 
world.  When China’s solar panel producers are financially troubled, so 
are, by extension, many state-owned banks that have loaned about U.S. 
$18 billion to these companies at low interest rates.99  In 2012, China’s 
largest solar panel producers suffered a loss of approximately U.S. $1.00 
for every U.S. $3.00 of sales because prices have fallen by three-fourths 
since 2008.100  Wholesale prices for solar panels dropped by 50 percent 
in 2012.101  Suntech, one of China’s largest solar panel producers, has 
cut its production by 40 percent, its share price has dropped by 60 
percent, and it even received a delisting warning from the New York 
Stock Exchange in late 2012.102  Trina Solar Limited, another large 
Chinese solar panel manufacturer, saw its shares drop by 85 percent over 
the past three years.103  Rory MacPherson, a spokesperson for Suntech, 
admits, “[i]t is not a Chinese industry problem, it is a global solar 
industry problem . . . It is primarily the result of an imbalance between 
supply and demand False”104  Jack Perkowski, a writer for Forbes 
Magazine, claims, “[t]he economics for the solar industry, both globally 
and in China, have never been worse, and there are no bright spots on 
the horizon.”105 
5. Context of Solar Subsidies Disputes
The solar industry is politically important for both China and the 
United States in a number of ways.  The Obama administration has 
prioritized creating new manufacturing jobs through building the 
98.  See Ucilia Wang, Report: Solar Panel Supply Will Far Exceed Demand Beyond 2012, 
FORBES (June 27, 2012 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/06/27/report-solar-
panel-production-will-far-exceed-demand-beyond-2012/. 
99.  James Kanter & Keith Bradsher, Europe and China Agree to Settle Solar Panel Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/business/global/european-union-
and-china-settle-solar-panel-fight.html?_r=0. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Wang, supra note 98. 
102.  Hook, supra note 96. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105. See Perkowski, supra note 67. 
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renewable energy sector, including solar energy.  The White House’s 
website highlights “Securing American Energy”106 by “deploy[ing] 
American assets, innovation, and technology so that we can safely and 
responsibly develop more energy here at home and be a leader in the 
global energy economy.”107  The United States justifies renewable 
energy subsidies as supporting a potentially strategic infant industry, one 
that requires help so it can compete both globally and with other 
conventional energy sources.108  China subsidizes its own solar energy 
industry for similar reasons.  Solar power is seen as one of the nascent 
fields in which China can effectively compete on a global scale, securing 
new export markets while providing a green energy source for its ever-
increasing domestic needs.  Both China and the United States are 
investing heavily in renewable energy, and both countries have made it a 
political and economic priority. 
China and the United States are now embroiled in trade disputes 
over green energy subsidies109 aimed at photovoltaic (“PV”) solar 
panels.110  The U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) and the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”) both approved imposing 
countervailing duties (“CVD”) on heavily subsidized imported PV solar 
panels from China.111  China, in response, launched its own 
investigations, finding that the United States also illegally subsidizes its 
solar energy industry.112  According to Scott Lincicome, an international 
trade attorney with White and Case, LLP, trade between China and the 
United States in the solar industry is just more than three billion 
dollars.113  While this is not a large percentage of overall United States-
China trade flow, the world’s two strongest economies are nonetheless 
in stiff competition to establish their own domestic industries in these 
technologies.  The stakes between China and the United States are seen 
 106.  Develop and Secure America’s Energy Resources, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 13, 2013) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securing-american-energy. 
107.  Id. 
 108.  Mark Muro, Do We Need Subsidies for Solar and Wind Power, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 
2012), http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444032404578008183300454400. 
html?mg=reno-wsj. 
109.  For a succinct and persuasive discussion of the economic and political rationale for 
regulating subsidies, see MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 68-70 
(2001). 
 110.  Michael Bastasch, Report: US Green Energy Subsidies Jeopardize American Companies, 
Global Markets, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 9, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/09/ 
report-green-energy-subsidies-jeopardize-us-companies-global-markets/. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
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as enormous due to the importance of solar as one of the pathways to 
“energy independence.”114 
6. China’s Current Solar Disputes
On October 19, 2011, SolarWorld Industries America, Inc., the 
largest producer of crystalline silicon PV products in the United States 
and a member of the Coalition for American Solar Manufacturers 
(“CASM”), filed a petition for countervailing duties against China at the 
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) and the International Trade Court 
(“ITC”).115  The investigation covered the time period from January 1, 
2010, through December 31, 2010.116  The petition sought to impose 
countervailing duties (“CVDs”) on imported PV panels from China to 
counteract government subsidies.  SolarWorld asserted in the petition 
that Chinese solar panel manufacturers receive “a wide range of illegal 
subsidies from the Chinese government, including massive cash grants, 
discounted raw material inputs such as polysilicon and aluminum; 
heavily discounted land; power and water; multibillion-dollar 
preferential loans and directed credit; tax exemptions, incentives and 
rebates; export assistance grants; and export insurance at referential 
rates.”117  Additionally, the petition claimed that the Chinese government 
granted more than U.S. $30 billion in subsidies to its domestic solar 
energy industry in 2010, with at least two billion dollars going to 
Suntech.118 
On March 20, 2012, in its preliminary findings, the DOC found that 
“at least 10 categories of Chinese subsidy programs are WTO-illegal and 
announce[d] its decision to impose a preliminary duty of 4.73 percent on 
U.S. imports from Trina Solar, 2.9 percent from Suntech, and 3.6 
percent from all other remaining Chinese manufacturers.”119  It also 
made a preliminary finding of “critical circumstances,” meaning the 
CVDs would apply retroactively to December 2011.120  On October 17, 
2012, the DOC confirmed in its final determination that “countervailable 
subsidies are being provided to producers and exporters of crystalline 
114.  Id. 
 115.  Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-481, 
731-TA-1190, USITC Pub. 4295, at 2 (Dec. 2011) (Preliminary). 
116.  Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, From China: Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 77 FED. REG. 63788 (Oct. 17, 2012). 
 117.  See Fact Sheet, COALITION FOR AM. SOLAR MFG., 
http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org/fact-sheet/. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Supra note 116. 
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silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules (solar 
cells) from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).”121 
The ITC, in its final determination on November 7, 2012, 
unanimously found “that a U.S. industry is materially injured by reason 
of imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules from 
China that the DOC has determined are subsidized and sold in the 
United States at less than fair value.”122  The only portion the ITC did 
not uphold was the application of “critical circumstances,” meaning the 
ITC disallowed retroactive duties.123  Trina Solar and Suntech were the 
primary targets of these duties as they comprised the “lion’s share” of 
exports to the United States.124  The final ruling assigned to Suntech a 
CVD of 14.78 percent and a 15.97 percent CVD to Trina Solar, while all 
other exporters were assigned a rate of 15.24 percent.125  The final tariff 
schedules are depicted in Figure 2 below: 
Source: Eric Wesoff, Final ITC Decision on SolarWorld’s China-US 
Solar Trade Complaint, GREENTECHMEDIA (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/case-casm. 
In the wake of these rulings, the Chinese government has already 
launched its own investigations into subsidies for the U.S.’s domestic 
solar energy industry.  The first two investigations found that the United 
States is using prohibited subsidies, and China is now considering 
whether or not to complain to the WTO or to take other remedial 
121.  Id. 
122.  Crystalline Silicone Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China Injure U.S. Industry, 
Says USITC, USITC (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2012/er1107kk1.htm. 
 123.  Eric Wesoff, Final ITC Decision on SolarWorld’s China-US Solar Trade Complaint, 
GREENTECHMEDIA (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/case-casm. 
 124.  Charles W. Thurston, Breaking: ITC Makes Unanimous Decision on Chinese Cell & 
Modules, RENEWABLENERGYWORLD.COM (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/news/article/2012/11/commerce-slams-chinese-cell-modules-with-final-duties. 
125.  Id. 
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action.126  The Chinese case is not without merit.  The Energy 
Information Administration, an independent arm of the Department of 
Energy, found that subsidies for energy markets in the United States rose 
from $17.9 billion in 2007 to $37.2 billion in 2010.127  Also in 2010, 
U.S. subsidies for renewable energy increased 186 percent, from $5.1 
billion to $14.7 billion, with solar energy receiving more than $1 billion 
in 2010.128  The potential for complaints on both sides notwithstanding, 
the U.S. is poised to bring its own complaints to the WTO soon. 
The United States has the option of filing a complaint against China 
at the WTO.129  The countervailing duties are already in place, as 
recently approved by the ITC, and the legal arguments have been tested 
and heard by both DOC and ITC.  The United States will claim that its 
domestic industry is materially injured or is threatened with material 
injury130 due to China’s subsidization of its solar panels. 
The United States could present three potential claims, and it could 
assert all three at once, or a combination of them.  First, the United 
States could allege that China is engaging in red-light, or prohibited 
export-contingent subsidies, which are automatically illegal under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties131 (the “SCM 
126.  See Bastasch, supra note110. 
 127.  Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2010, 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2011), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 
128.  Id. at xiii. 
129.  Under the WTO system, member nations confronted with illegal subsidies may choose 
between either a multilateral solution or a unilateral one, but not both simultaneously or 
cumulatively.  The aggrieved party can initiate a WTO dispute settlement procedure to seek the 
removal of the subsidy by another WTO member.  In such a dispute, the SCM Agreement governs.  
In the alternative, it can choose to unilaterally impose a countervailing (or off-setting) duty on the 
subsidized import.  The unilateral approach usually begins when a domestic industry injured by 
subsidized imports from another country initiates a countervailing duty investigation under its 
country’s domestic laws.  If the investigation finds that the subsidy is present and is more than de 
minimus (more than 1 percent of the ad valorum value), then it can impose a duty on the subsidized 
import that countervails or offsets the financial advantage of the subsidy.  The findings of the 
domestic countervailing duty investigation are also subject to WTO review under the SCM 
Agreement.  The countervailing duty is designed solely to level the playing field by neutralizing the 
effect of the subsidy.  It is not punitive, nor does it require the subsidizing foreign government to 
remove its subsidy, although it creates pressure to do so by removing the benefit of the subsidy, at 
least for the one relevant import market. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
(Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
 130.  For an excellent exposition of the challenges involved in prosecuting “injury to domestic 
industry” or “nullification and impairment” claims, see Richard H. Steinberg & Timothy E. Josling, 
When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal 
Challenge, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 369, 379-85 (2003). 
131.  See SCM Agreement, supra note 129. 
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Agreement”).  Second, the United States may argue that China is 
engaging in yellow-light, actionable subsidies that have caused serious 
prejudice to the U.S. domestic industry through price suppression.  
Third, the United States could claim that China’s is engaging in yellow-
light subsidies that are causing material injury to the U.S. domestic 
industry.  Subsidies cases are legally and factually complex.  Because 
such WTO cases rely heavily on industry-specific economic data, it is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the technical aspects of 
potential claims in any detail.132  However, an overview of the most 
salient threshold questions is beneficial to the core interest discussion 
because it highlights the ways in which the core interests are expressed 
in China’s support of the solar industry. 
The United States must first establish that specific subsidies exist.  
As noted above, a subsidy exists when a government or public body has 
made a financial contribution in the form of direct or indirect transfer of 
funds, loans, grants, tax credits, and the provision of goods and 
services.133  Secondly, it must show that a benefit to China’s solar 
industry has been conferred.134  Lastly, the subsidy must be specific to 
China’s solar energy industry.135 
The United States will likely be able to establish that China is 
subsidizing its solar energy industry.  The United States can argue that 
the Chinese government has made financial contributions in several 
forms.  Reuters reported that on December 12, 2012, the Chinese 
government allocated seven billion yuan (U.S. $1.1 billion) to its solar 
industry, taking China’s total subsidization this year to 13 billion yuan 
(U.S. $2 billion).136  State-run banks, which can, depending on their 
actions and duties, be considered a “public body,”137 have given these 
 132.  See generally Janie Hauser, From Sleeping Giant to Friendly Giant: Rethinking the 
United States Solar Energy Trade War with China, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG, 1062, 1063, 
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume38/issue-4-summer-2013/from-
sleeping-giant-to-friendly-giant-rethinking-theunited-states-solar-energy-trade-war-with-china/. 
133.  Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1). 
134.  Id. at art. 1.1(b). 
135.  Id. at art. 2. 
136.  Swetha Gopinath & Krishna N Das, China Doubles Solar Subsidies, U.S.-Listed Stocks 
Jump, REUTERS (Dec 12, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-
chinesesolarcompanies-shares-idUSBRE8BB16B20121212. 
 137.  “The Appellate Body also found that the USDOC had not acted inconsistently with the 
same obligations in determining, on the basis of evidence relating inter alia to the Government of 
China’s role in the banking sector, that certain State-owned commercial banks that provided loans to 
investigated companies constituted ‘public bodies.’”  United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (the case summary provides a 
brief explanation of the case’s findings). 
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companies U.S. $18 billion in low-interest loans.138  Domestic programs, 
such as China’s goal to install ten gigawatts of solar panels per year until 
2015, is driven by twenty-year guaranteed government contracts to pay 
for the electricity produced.139  Over this timeframe, this would amount 
to U.S. $50 billion in subsidies, according to Li Junfeng of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planning 
agency in the form of guaranteed government contracts.140  China 
recently announced it will reinstate its programs known as Building 
Integrated Photovoltaic (“BIPV”) and “Golden Sun.”141  BIPV, in its 
first rendition, subsidized costs at fifteen yuan per watt for rooftop 
systems and twenty yuan per watt for BIPV systems.142  China’s media 
outlets reports this amounted to 1.2 billion yuan in 2009.143  Golden Sun 
offered 50 percent of investments for solar projects over 500 MW 
including the necessary distribution networks within two to three 
years.144  For rural projects not connected to the grid, China offered to 
contribute 70 percent of the investment.145  The financial contributions 
are clear: direct transfers of funds, loans, and guaranteed government 
contracts. 
Secondly, considering the raw numbers, it would be difficult to 
argue these contributions have not conferred a benefit.  A benefit means 
the companies are better off than they otherwise would have been 
relative to the world marketplace.  China’s spike in solar panel 
production, such that it now accounts for 50 percent of all global trade 
and vastly outperforms all other countries, is a strong indication that 
these subsidies have benefitted its domestic solar energy industry 
relative to the global trade market.146  Finally, these subsidies are 
specific because they are targeted at and limited to a specific industry, 
138.  See Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  The Golden Sun of China, PVGROUP, http://www.pvgroup.org/events/ctr_031358; 
China: Golden Sun Subsidies Announced – 50% on Large Scale Solar Projects, CLEANERGY.ORG 
(Jul. 22, 2009), http://cleanergy.blogspot.com/2009/07/china-golden-sun-subsidies-announced-
50.html. 
142.  The Golden Sun of China, supra note 141. 
 143.  China’s National Solar Subsidy Programs, CHINA POLICY IN FOCUS, 
https://sites.google.com/site/chinapolicyinfocus/china-s-solar-subsidy-programs/china-s-solar-
industry/china-s-national-solar-subsidy-programs. 
144.  Robert D. Kaplan, The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on 
Land and at Sea?, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 23 (2010). 
145.  Id. 
 146.  Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme, Annual Report 2011, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 
46 (2011), www.iea-pvps.org/index.php?id=6&eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1129 [hereinafter 
IEA]. 
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the solar energy industry.  These subsides are not available for other 
enterprises based on fulfilling objective criteria for eligibility. The solar 
energy industry is the sole recipient of these subsidies, thus they are 
specific. 
Although little public information exists that definitively states 
China is providing prohibited subsidies, one glaring statistic strongly 
suggests China may be doing so.  In 2011, China exported 95 percent of 
all PV solar panels, with only five percent absorbed by its domestic 
market.  It is difficult to imagine that China, even with only a fraction of 
its energy consumption from solar, can absorb only five percent of its 
production capacity.  Such a discrepancy is highly suspicious and 
suggests that instead of marketing solar panels to the domestic market, 
companies export them to receive further subsidies.  Additionally, China 
has been the largest PV producer in the world since 2007, achieving a 
more than 100 percent increase in production capacity each year since 
2007.147  In 2011, China’s solar panels accounted for 50 percent of all 
global trade in solar panels.148  Such extreme export-orientation is 
difficult to ignore. 
The United States would present a similar argument.  As noted 
above, China has pumped roughly U.S. $2 billion into its solar energy 
industry this year, U.S. $30 billion in 2010, and forecasts show China 
will spend another U.S. $50 billion in the next 20 years.149  China’s 
gross revenue on imports to the United States was more than three 
billion dollars,150 thus subsidies were roughly 65 percent of China’s 
revenue on imports to the United States.  China also accounted for half 
of the world’s exports in solar panels last year, giving it substantial 
influence on the world market for prices.151  Its production capacity 
alone outweighs the world’s demand for solar panels.152 
The United States would argue that this subsidization program has 
driven China’s tremendous solar panel production expansion.  As a 
result, solar panel prices have fallen by three-fourths since 2008,153 the 
same year China began this expansion, and wholesale prices dropped 50 
percent within the last year and continue to fall.154  Between 2008 and 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  See Gopinath & Das, supra note 136; see also Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99; Fact 
Sheet, supra note 117. 
150.  See Bastasch, supra note 110. 
151.  IEA, supra note 146. 
152.  See Wang, supra note 98; see also Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99. 
153.  See Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99. 
154.  See Wang, supra note 98. 
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2010, according to CASM, China’s solar exports rose 350 percent, and 
its production capacity rose by over 100 percent every year for the past 
five years.155  The glut of Chinese solar panels on the world market is 
significant and has a dramatic effect on world prices.  The United States 
is likely to be able to show that China’s subsidization program has 
caused the United States domestic solar energy industry serious 
prejudice through price suppression and violated the SCM Agreement 
and its obligations under the WTO.  Therefore, unless China and the 
U.S. can reach a political compromise similar to the resolution reached 
in the China –European Union dispute (described below), the U.S. has a 
sound basis for seeking redress before the WTO. 
7. China’s Solar Disputes with the European Union
China’s solar industry subsidies have spilled over to both sides of 
the Atlantic.  “The row over solar technology is one of the most 
contentious in current world-trade disputes, increasing tensions between 
Beijing, Washington and Brussels.”156  The European Union (‘EU”) has 
also accused China of unfairly subsidizing its solar panel firms,157 
thereby allowing Chinese firms to dump below-cost solar panels into 
their markets and undercutting rival European producers.158  In 2012, it 
is estimated that about twenty one billion euros (U.S. $28 billion) worth 
of low-cost solar panels were imported from China into European 
countries, forcing several European solar firms to shut their doors.159  As 
tensions continued to escalate, the E.U. Trade Commissioner responded 
by enacting punitive tariffs on China’s manufactured solar panels, a 
threat opposed by some E.U. national governments.160  China countered 
by threatening to impose duties on European imports of polysilicon, a 
material used in solar panels, and wine.161  China also filed a WTO 
155.  See IEA, supra note 146; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 117. 
156.  Id. 
157.  EU to Investigate Chinese Solar Panel Subsidies, BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20249003 [hereinafter EU to Investigate]; Dinny McMahon & 
Carlos Tejada, China Complains to WTO Over EU Solar Subsidies, WALL ST. J. (November 5, 
2012, 10:17 AM), http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204349404578100741581 
635834.html?mg=reno64-wsj. 
 158.  Robin Emmot & Ben Blanchard, EU, China Resolve Solar Dispute – Their Biggest Trade 
Row by Far, REUTERS (July 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/27/us-eu-china-
solar-idUSBRE96Q03Z20130727. 
159.  Id. 
 160.  V.V.V., Sabres Rattled and Ready, THE ECONOMIST (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/07/european-trade.  
161.  Id. 
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complaint against the European Union for subsidizing its solar 
components such as poly-silicon.162 
With the global price of solar panels being driven down by over-
production and China’s unfair trade practices, and with tariffs levied 
against China by its largest export market for solar panel products,163 
both China and the European Union were motivated to take a seat at the 
negotiation table.  After six weeks of discussion, the European Union 
and Chinese solar-panel producers announced an agreement on July 27, 
2013, defusing the long-standing trade dispute.164  In a statement 
regarding the negotiated resolution, European trade commissioner Karel 
De Gucht announced, “[w]e have found an amicable solution that will 
result in a new equilibrium on the European solar panel market at a 
sustainable price level.”165  China agreed to set a minimum price for its 
solar panels at 56 euro cents per watt (74 cents), a “near spot market 
price,”166 of as much as 7 gigawatts in the European Union market until 
the end of 2015.167  If China’s producers do not adhere to these 
conditions, they will find themselves subject to the European Union’s 
antidumping tariffs set to sharply increase from 11.8 percent to an 
average of nearly 50 percent.168  Thus, the European Union –China solar 
dispute may rear its head again. 
8. The Solar Energy Dispute from China’s Core Interests
Perspective 
China is unlikely to back down significantly from its multipronged 
support of the solar energy industry.  The core interest analysis helps to 
lay bare the stakes from China’s perspective.  Sustainable energy 
sources development is a keystone in China’s stable economic 
development.  China is keen to wean itself of dependence on fossil fuels, 
especially coal, for a host of environmental169, public health170, 
162.  McMahon & Tejada, supra note 157. 
 163.  EU and China Agree Minimum Import Price Near Spot Price, CNBC (July 29, 2013, 
12:53 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100919695.  
164.  Jonathan Steams, European Commission Approves Chinese Solar-Panel Trade Pact, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-02/eu-solar-panel-
accord-with-china-approved-by-european-commission.  
165.  Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99. 
166.  See Moore, supra note 5. 
167.  Art Patnaude & Gabriele Steinhauser, EU, China Reach Agreement on Solar-Panel 
Dispute, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2013, 12:50 PM) http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324564704578631323954623876. 
168.  Id. 
169.  China Overtakes US in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007), 
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geopolitical171, and economic172 reasons.  All these reasons lead logically 
to China’s state-owned banks giving of more than U.S. $18 billion in 
low-interest loans to Chinese solar companies.173  It also explains 
China’s policy to guarantee the purchase of any solar-generated 
electricity for twenty years under the Golden Sun program.174  Not only 
is the Golden Sun program politically beneficial by encouraging the 
consumption of clean energy, it also incentives the growth of a vibrant 
new industry in solar panel production and installation. 
Export-driven trade policies have proven to be a highly successful 
strategy for China’s economic insurgence.  The solar panel industry 
presents a stark example of China’s export-focused trade policy. 
Ninety-five percent of all solar panels produced in China were exported 
in 2012.175  The Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing 
(“CASM”), a union of seven different American solar companies, claims 
imports of Chinese solar panels rose more than 350 percent between 
2008 and 2010.176  CASM is alarmed by the enormous influx of Chinese 
imports and the accompanying 20 percent decline in American exports 
of polysilicon (used in the manufacture of solar panels) and 
machinery.177  In the course of two years, the United States trade 
position with China has done a complete about-face.  CASM states that 
“[i]n 2010, the United States managed to hold on to a small solar trade 
surplus with China of less than $500 million.  However, in 2011, the 
United States had a $1.6 billion [solar] trade deficit with China.”178  
China succeeded in dominating the United States’ solar panel market in 
a matter of two years as a result of an aggressive import-focused trade 
policy. 
Clean and stable sources of energy are critical for China’s social 
stability, especially with the increasing number of protests over 
environmental contamination and health problems caused by air 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html. 
 170.  See Edward Wong, On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing’s Air Quality Tops ‘Crazy Bad’ at 755, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/science/earth/beijing-air-
pollution-off-the-charts.html?_r=0. 
171.  Kaplan, supra note 144. 
172.  See Ma, supra note 46, at 2-3. 
173.  See Bradsher, supra note 99.  
174.  Id. 
175.  See Mathews, supra note 94. 
176.  See Fact Sheet, COALITION FOR AM. SOLAR MFG., 
http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org/fact-sheet/. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
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pollution.179  China spent a staggering U.S. $111 billion in 2012180, and 
that amount will increase by 8.7 percent in 2013181 to 769.1 billion 
yuan182 (approximately U.S. $126 billion).  The increased spending on 
internal security “underscore the ruling Communist Party’s vigilance not 
only about territorial disputes with Japan and Southeast Asia and the 
U.S. “pivot” back to the region, but also about popular unrest over 
corruption, pollution and abuse of power, despite robust economic 
growth and rising incomes.”183  With the rise of the large and vocal 
middle class increasingly focused on air pollution and public health 
problems, the Chinese government sees energy scarcity as a hot-button 
issue that may de-stabilize domestic security.  Promoting renewables, 
including solar energy, is therefore not only good environmental and 
energy policy, but also good defense policy. 
The solar energy industry implicates critical core interests for 
China, such as sustainable energy resources, sustained economic growth, 
and internal security.  For these reasons, a sustained trade dispute 
involving the solar industry is perhaps inevitable.  Even though China 
has recently reached a compromise with the European Union184 over 
solar panel subsidies, “[t]he U.S.—China Solar Trade War is far from 
over.”185 
IV. POLICY AND NORMATIVE LESSONS
Appreciating China’s core interests through its trade policies is 
important in four distinct, but related ways.  First, to the extent that past 
behavior is a predictor of future behavior, the core interest analysis 
enables us to discern certain patterns in China’s domestic policy and 
foreign policy.  Among these, a greater willingness to project its power 
regionally may irritate its neighbors, but will also provide a platform for 
the global projection of political power.186  That has already been 
happening in Africa, where China as opportunistically filled a 
179.  See Wong, supra note 170. 
180.  See China Domestic Security Spending Rises to $111 Billion, supra note 31. 
181.  Ben Blanchard & John Ruwitch, China Hikes Defense Budget to Spend More in Internal 
Security, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2013, 3:49AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-china-
parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  See Emmot & Blanchard, supra note 158. 
185.  Thurston, supra note 124. 
186.  KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (presenting a 
“neorealist” formulation which assumes that states are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek 
their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination”). 
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superpower vacuum, but is likely to occur in other areas.  As China 
extends its geopolitical and economic reach, it will inevitably become 
enmeshed in more policy arenas, drawing it into more active roles in 
international organizations and global governance structures.187 
Second, in the trade arena, applying the core interest analysis helps 
us predict which WTO and other trade dispute cases China will 
prosecute or defend most zealously (see Part III.B’s case studies).  Much 
more is at stake than esoteric questions of legal compliance with the 
SCM Agreement.  While those issues are important, particularly in light 
of China’s desire to be perceived by the international community as a 
country that follows the rule of law, they are subservient to overriding 
core interests like sovereignty, economic development, and social order.  
Even though these interests cannot be explicitly raised in any trade 
dispute, they are nonetheless highly salient.  It is critical for China’s 
trading partners to understand how these core interests influence the 
Chinese government’s framing of legal issues that do not seem to 
implicate any of these interests.  Given that the WTO system maintains 
the political bargaining vestige of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) system through the consultations process,188 where 
many disputes are solved through a political compromise process, 
having an appreciation of the core interests may help other countries 
better frame possible compromises in WTO disputes.  Lawyers do not 
tend to think in terms of real-politik solutions to seemingly pure legal 
problems.  However, such myopia is both misguided and wrong-headed.  
A rich vein of law and society literature has demonstrated that legal 
disputes are often guided by non-legal concerns such as reputation,189 
 187.  Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, a central thinker in liberal legal theory, has long 
asserted that one of the “most important and effective” means of global governance is not top-down 
international treaty law but “direct regulation of private actors . . . with deliberate transnational or 
global intent.”  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 240, 245 (2000). 
 188.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter 
DSU], at Arts. XXII and XXIII; See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System 
of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 
1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1205-24 (1994) (providing a succinct but exhaustive 
description and analysis of the functioning of the DSU). 
 189.  See e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2002) (noting that states comply to preserve reputations and avoid 
informal and formal sanctions); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: 
Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 500 (1997) [hereinafter Keohane, Two Optics] (reasoning that 
institutions facilitate compliance with international law by shaping reputations). 
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reciprocity,190 and perceptions of social fairness.191  These concerns are 
often relevant in the case of public international disputes as well.  In a 
similar vein, in any negotiations it is important to grasp both your 
counterpart’s articulated main concerns (including instrumental gains)192 
as well as underlying interests.193 
The core interest analysis also yields insights on China’s future role 
in coalition and alliance-building attempts, which are especially 
important for smaller developing countries. Despite being a trade 
behemoth, China views itself as aligned with developing economies on a 
surprising array of economic, development, market access, investment, 
and other trade-related issues.  Much of this is due to China’s status as a 
developing nation, one that China cynically uses on many occasions as a 
club.194  However, real synergies do exist between China and a diffuse 
group of developing nations, whose identities shift depending on the 
issue at hand.  Market access for agricultural food products provides a 
good example.  China has joined with Argentina to attack Chile’s price 
bands for agricultural products,195 Brazil and Thailand in attacking 
European customs treatment of chicken,196 Thailand in protesting 
European export subsidies for sugar,197 and Ecuador against U.S. 
antidumping measures on shrimp.198  These examples are all related to 
China’s role in the WTO dispute settlement, but many synergies are 
untapped in the field of bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations as 
well.  Countries that wish to cooperate with China can better frame their 
coalition building or negotiations strategies to appeal to China’s core 
 190.  See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7-
9 (1995) (states will comply with regimes they perceive to be legitimate); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey?] (arguing that compliance arises from internalization of legal norms). 
 191.  Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, n.72 (1974). 
 192.  JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) 
(analyzing compliance through rational choice theory and proposing that states comply with 
international law only for instrumental reasons). 
 193.  See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 42-57 (Bruce Patton, ed., revised ed., 2011) (arguing for a principled 
negotiations strategy that focuses on party’s interests rather than positions). 
194.  See Guzman supra note 31, at 307. 
 195.  See Appellate Body Report, Chile — Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002). 
196.   See Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Customs Classification of Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2005). 
 197.  See Panel Report, European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS283/R 
(adopted May 19, 2005). 
 198.  See Panel Report, United States — Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador, 
WT/DS335/R (adopted Feb. 20, 2007). 
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interests.  In other words, understanding the core interests and how they 
play out in WTO litigation and negotiations will help countries predict 
areas in which China will likely be an ally.  These observations lead to 
significant implications for international global governance that are 
elaborated in detail in the next subsection. 
V. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF CORE INTERESTS 
ANALYSIS 
Current theories of effective global governance do not easily 
accommodate core interests.  It is more common to find methodologies 
derived the political science199 and international relations literatures,200 
which in turn uneasily grapples with complex legal regimes like the 
WTO and the ever-increasingly complex web of investment and free 
trade treaties that make up the global trade regime.201  Within the legal 
literature on international economic law, grappling with messy realist202 
or neo-realist203 interest-based analysis is eschewed in favor of analysis 
based on liberal theory,204 institutionalism,205 or transnational norm 
theories.206 
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, a central thinker in liberal legal 
theory, has long asserted that one of the “most important and effective” 
 199.  See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 41 (2005). 
 200.  See ROBERT POWELL, IN THE SHADOW OF POWER, STATES AND STRATEGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, (1999) (canvassing the international relations literature and providing a 
persuasive analysis of how states behave under threat). 
 201.  See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global 
Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 497 & nn.13-14, 498 & nn.15-17 (2012) 
(collecting literature on multilateral treaty failures and identifying why treaties are ineffective at 
coordinating global financial regulations). 
 202.  HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE (classic version, 1948). 
 203.  KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (presenting a 
“neorealist” formulation which assumes that states are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek 
their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination”). 
 204.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International 
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 718-19 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, Liberal 
IR Theory] (suggesting that productive insights for international lawyers may be gained by 
exploring the assumptions of international relations theory). 
 205.  See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 8, at 7-16 (1989) (coining the term “neoliberal 
institutionalism” and distinguishing this from other interest-based international relations theories); 
See also, Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 189, at 490 (explaining the institutionalist account as 
arising from the intuition that states sometimes “forgo the short-term advantages derived from 
violating [[those] rules” in order to maintain the international system (quoting Phillip R. Trimble, 
International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 833 (1990)). 
206.  See, e.g., Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 190; FRANCK, supra note 190. 
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means of global governance is not top-down international treaty law but 
“direct regulation of private actors . . . with deliberate transnational or 
global intent.”207  In addition to transnational regulatory networks, 
Slaughter also lauds the spread of “private regimes” arising from 
corporate codes of conduct or industry association norms that take on 
transnational effect.208  Others also champion voluntary law over 
traditional, top down and state-centrist law or treaties.  In an influential 
piece, Professors Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal criticize the 
“persistent regulatory inadequacies” of treaty-based “international ‘Old 
Governance’” and encourage states and intergovernmental organizations 
to focus attention on promoting voluntary networks, which might fill 
governance gaps.209  Abbott and Snidal call this collection of voluntary 
mechanisms “Transnational New Governance.”210  In this new 
governance model, private actors such as industry groups, corporations, 
and investor groups collaborate internationally, sometimes with Non-
Governmental Organizations (“NGO”), states, standardization 
organization, or international institutions, to generate and enforce new 
norms for transnational conduct.211 
Much of this scholarship emphasizes private regulation, often 
voluntary, over state action.  However, private regulation takes places in 
the shadow of traditional laws and treaties.212  Even within the context of 
Transnational New Governance, private actors and their NGO 
collaborators cannot afford to ignore the core interests of their 
governmental interlocutors if they hope to achieve meaningful change.  
This article makes a valuable contribution to the legal, political science, 
and international relations literatures by showing ways in which China’s 
core interests may be easily injected into either a public or private-action 
207.  See Slaughter, A Liberal Theory, supra note 187, at 245. 
 208.  Id. at 243.  In Slaughter’s conception, there are two forms of “directly” regulating law, 
and both are more effective at structuring private behavior and “get[ting] at the root of the problem” 
than public international law, which affects private conduct only through the intermediation of the 
state.  Id. at 245-46.  These two forms are voluntary norms with transnational effect created by 
business and industry groups, and national regulations that reach across national borders to govern 
extraterritorially.  Id. 
209.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 545 (2009) (describing and advocating a transnationally linked and voluntarily 
promulgated system of regulatory norms). 
210.  Id. at 509. 
211.  Id. at 505-6. 
212.  Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal Law: Comment, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 249, 250 
(2000) (observing that many of the nontraditional modes of global governance are “nestled within 
traditional treaty regimes”). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/5
2014] TRADING WITH  FOREIGNERS 843 
analysis.  Core interests play a critical role not only in territorial and 
political disputes (like Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea island 
disputes), but also in the more esoteric realm of WTO dispute 
settlement, where private actors often play a direct role, albeit behind the 
scenes.213  Directly naming the core interests have great value.  This 
section lays out the explicative, predictive, persuasive, and coalition-
building values of a core interest analysis. 
A. Explicative Value 
The core interest analysis explains, to a large extent, China’s 
intractability in many areas that have consistently caused international 
controversy, such as human rights, democracy, Taiwan, and Tibet.  
While it is clearly beyond the scope of this article to thoroughly discuss, 
much less propose solutions, to any of these long-term controversies, it 
is nonetheless worthwhile to examine briefly how the core interests 
analysis bears on each of them.  China usually defends its human rights 
record with outright denials, obfuscations, indignation, or by relying on 
national sovereignty arguments.214  However, from a core interest 
perspective, the human rights dilemma (writ large) implicates not only 
sovereignty, but also social stability or public order, and the dominance 
of the Communist Party.  Because human rights issues are so interwoven 
with these important core interests, it explains why China is often so 
recalcitrant over seemingly small human rights concessions, or why 
policy changes tend to be only temporary, such as during the Beijing 
Olympics.  If human rights activists want meaningful, lasting change, 
they need to directly tackle the underlying core interests and craft 
solutions that address them.  Tibet provides another example of how the 
core interest analysis has strong explicative power. 
Tibet implicates only sovereignty concerns, but also economic 
development.  Tibet is seen as providing critical lebensraum (or living 
space) for China’s growing population.  This explains why China refuses 
to make public statistics on the number of ethnic Han Chinese 
immigrants to Tibet.215  It also explains the massive influx of 
 213.  See generally Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies 
Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383 (2008). 
 214.  Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004) (noting that international law affects state 
behavior through a process of “acculturation” in which various actors feel compelled to assimilate 
through interaction with other actors). 
 215.  See Wong supra note 37, (“Chinese officials say Tibetans make up more than 95 percent 
of the region’s 2.9 million people, but refuse to give estimates on Han migrants, who are not 
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infrastructural investment in Tibet in recent years, like the U.S. $3.83 
billion Qinghai-Tibet Railway completed in 2006.216  The Chinese 
government invested U.S. $3 billion in the Tibet Autonomous Region in 
2009, a 31 percent increase from 2008.217  Tibet is seen as an economic 
opportunity for China.  Again, these observations are not meant to be 
justificatory or apologist by any means, but a realistic assessment that 
any calls for reform must tackle the underlying issues.  As much as one 
might like to think of Tibetan independence as a pure self-determination 
and human rights issue, one cannot ignore the economic perspective.  
Indeed, one of the primary benefits of the core interest analysis is that it 
pinpoints the interrelated and competing interests underlying complex 
issues like Tibet and human rights concerns more broadly.  As such, the 
core interest analysis is helpful not only for its explicative value, but also 
for calling for further scholarships that apply the core interest analysis to 
such issues. 
B. Predictive Value 
The core interest analysis also holds predictive value, particularly 
in the area of trade disputes, either at the WTO or domestic level.  One 
would expect China to zealously defend or prosecute cases that implicate 
the core interest of economic development.  While all trade disputes 
directly or indirectly implicate economic development in one way or 
another, the prediction is strong for cases that implicate China’s policy 
space to pursue its particular brand of economic development –namely, 
export driven economic growth coupled with sustainable (and socially 
stable) growth in domestic consumption by the middle-class. 
Thus, the on-going solar dispute directly impinges on both types of 
issues.  As discussed in Part III.B, the solar industry has both real and 
symbolic values that the core interest analysis highlights.  Solar energy 
is an emerging industry that is important to China’s continued economic 
development.  The solar industry, supported through subsidies, tax 
breaks, and collaboration with state-owned enterprises is typical of the 
overall structure China has created to encourage exports.  Therefore, it 
has symbolic value not only as a representative of China’s economic 
strategy, but also as proof of China’s ability to innovate in cutting-edge 
technologies. 
registered residents”). 
 216.  Xinhua News Agency, New Height of World’s Railway Born in Tibet, CHINA VIEW (Aug. 
24, 2005, 4:38 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-08/24/content_3397297.htm. 
217.  Id. 
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Lastly, solar is important for China’s social stability.  China’s ever-
increasing demand for energy resources has caused social tensions, such 
as the populist protests against land seizures for a power station in 
Yunnan Province,218 as well as a host of health concerns arising from air 
pollution.  While solar energy can ease the demand for heavily polluting 
fossil fuels, it too has come under scrutiny.  In September 2011, 
hundreds of residents in Zhejiang Province stormed the factory of 
Zhejiang Jinko Solar Co. Ltd., a solar panel manufacturer, to protest the 
emission of toxic gases and waste.219  Nonetheless, China is unlikely to 
reverse its current policy of supporting the solar energy industry both as 
a green alternative to fossil fuels and as a symbol of China’s model of 
export-driven economic development. 
C. Persuasive Value 
Understanding the core interests gives China’s interlocutors access 
to the persuasive power of the core interests.  It gives negotiators, 
activists, academics, policy-makers, and decision-makers of all types a 
new set of tools to use to strategically frame issues in terms of core 
interests.  Not only is it important to appreciate the effect of the core 
values (requiring both the explicative and predictive functions), one 
must understand how to best use the core interests for advocacy or 
negotiations purposes.  This accords with the best practices in effective 
negotiations in all contexts,220 and it applies to China across a large 
range of issues. 
Consider the solar energy industry disputes as an example.  
Assume, as is likely, that the trade dispute results in the filing of a WTO 
complaint by the United States against China, triggering automatic 
consultations between the parties.  If the United States hopes to achieve 
a satisfactory negotiated solutions to the dispute, it needs to muster not 
only all the WTO arguments, but also frame its proposed solutions in 
reference to China’s core interests.  One possible compromise might be 
for China to agree to a voluntary phasing out of certain tax benefits or 
indirect subsidies to solar panel manufacturers in return for a similar 
phasing out of the United States Department of Commerce imposed 
 218.  Major Protests and Riots in China in 2011 and 2012, FACTS AND DETAILS, 
http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat8/sub49/item1894.html. 
 219.  Elaine Kurtenbach, Over 500 Villagers Protest China Factory Pollution, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 19, 2011, 12:30 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/over-500-villagers-protest-
china-factory-pollution-0. 
 220.  See FISHER, supra note 193, at 42-57 (arguing for a principled negotiations strategy that 
focuses on party’s interests rather than positions). 
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countervailing duties on solar panels imported to the United States from 
China.  In addition, both countries could promise not to attack each 
other’s policies for the guaranteed purchase of solar electricity.  Such a 
compromise would satisfy China’s interest in having an export market, 
but also the United States’ interest in protecting its own domestic solar 
panel manufactures.  It would recognize that China has an interest in 
encouraging the development of green energy sources for domestic 
consumption, an important aspect of China’s internal social stability. 
D. Coalition-Building Value 
Lastly, the core interest analysis can be leveraged to provide 
strategic coalition building value for developing nations within the 
international trade regime.  I have argued elsewhere for a number of 
different ways to improve the WTO’s responsiveness to the needs of 
developing nations, both within the dispute settlement context221 and 
otherwise.222  Many other scholars have contributed to this large 
literature.223  The lack of meaningful access the smaller developing 
 221.  See generally Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Developing Nations: 
The Need for Class Actions, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REVIEW 151, 159 (2011) (making the case for 
limited class action remedy). 
 222.  See generally Phoenix X.F. Cai, Aid for Trade: A Roadmap for Success, 36 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 283 (2008). 
 223.  See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127 (2007); 
Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of 
Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 557-58 (2005); Chad P. 
Bown, Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes, 27 
WORLD ECON. 59 (Jan. 2004); Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN 
AFF. 130 (2003); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS? RETALIATION UNDER THE 
WTO (2003); Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement, 1 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 123 (2002); Claude Barfield, WTO Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change, 37 
INTERECONOMICS 131 (2002); Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation 
in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005); 
Chi Charmody, Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 307 
(2002); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 (2001); Patricio 
Grané, Remedies Under WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 755 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement 
and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules — Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. 
J. INT’L L 335 (2000); Robert Howse & Robert W. Staiger, United States —Anti-Dumping Act of 
1916 (Original Complaint by the European Communities)—Recourse to Arbitration by the United 
States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 295 (2005); JOHN H. JACKSON, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE 
WTO: EMERGING PROBLEMS, IN FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 67 (2000); Jason E. Kearns & Steve Charnovitz, Adjudicating 
Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (2002); Pieter Jan 
Kuyper, Remedies and Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to Be Effective? The State 
Perspective and the Company Perspective, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 282 (1997); Kofi Oteng 
Kufuor, From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the Procedures 
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nations face to the WTO’s dispute settlement and negotiations forums 
remains one of the lingering weaknesses of the WTO system.224  Even 
though the Doha round of WTO trade talks finally, after a decade-long 
deadlock225 reached agreement on some issues,226 it is nonetheless 
critical to find creative ways to move forward on important global trade 
issues in fora other than cumbersome multilateral negotiations.  While 
some commentators fear the fracturing of the WTO regime due to the 
rise of bilateral agreements,227 others see an opportunity to foster strong 
regional alliances.228  In a climate of regionalism and bilateralism, 
effective coalition-building strategies are essential. 
In terms of coalition building or strategic alliances, developing 
for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117 (1997); Nikolaos 
Lavranos, Some Proposals for a Fundamental DSU Reform, 29 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. ECON. 
INTEGRATION 73 (2002); Robert M. MacLean, The Urgent Need to Reform the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Process, 8 INT’L TRADE L. REG. 137 (2002); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO 
Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000); Victor Mosoti, In 
Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Process; A View from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B. U. INT’L L. J. 231 (2001); Joost 
Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules — Toward a More 
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335 (2000); Timothy M. Reif & M. Florestal, Revenge of 
the Push-Me, Pull-You: The Implementation Process under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW. 755 (1998); Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS 
Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403 
(2000); ALAN O. SYKES, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance? NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard 
Quick eds., 2000); Henrik Horn, et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased? 
C.E.P.R. DISCUSSION PAPER 2340, (1999).  In addition to the academic literature, there are a 
number of proposals by states in connection with current WTO negotiations in the Doha Round. 
These are helpfully listed and summarized at Marylin Johnson Raisch, Website Survey 2009, J. 
INT’L ECON. LAW (Mar. 23, 2010), http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/03/23/jiel. 
jgq010.full. In particular, see Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal by 
the African Group, TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 25, 2002) (proposing “monetary compensation to be 
continually paid pending and until the withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO obligations” 
and including a number of proposals by commentators). 
 224.  Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-
SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 1, 26, 51-52 (ICTSD, 2003). 
 225.  See Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, BRIDGES-WEEKLY 
TRADE NEWS DIGEST (July 26, 2006), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6354/ (“The Doha 
Round of trade negotiations was put into deep freeze on 24 July, after a meeting of ministers from 
six key trading nations collapsed over divisions on how to cut farm subsidies and tariffs.”); see also, 
In the Twilight of Doha, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 63. 
 226.  The Editorial Board, Trade Talks Produce a Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/opinion/trade-talks-produce-a-deal.html. 
227. See Urata, supra, note 65, at 2-3. 
 228.  For a succinct discussion of the trend of new regionalism, see generally, Trade and 
Development Report, 2007, UNCTAD, OVERVIEW VIII-X, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007fas_en.pdf. 
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nations labor at a disadvantage.229  They have fewer bargaining chips,230 
wield little economic strength,231 and are handicapped by collective 
action difficulties,232 as well as divergent interests.233  Despite these 
difficulties, we are beginning to see encouraging trends in the WTO 
arena, in the emergence of influential groups like the G20234 that have 
been active at the WTO.235 
However, China has yet to fulfill its promise and take on a decisive 
leadership role in the international trade arena, both in terms of dispute 
resolution236 and trade negotiations.237  It is difficult not to deplore the 
wasted potential and lost opportunities.238  Perhaps the most intriguing 
aspect of the core interest analysis is its usefulness in future coalition 
building efforts.  The core interest analysis may be leveraged to benefit 
nations seeking alliances with China on a variety of issues.  At the most 
basic level, understanding the core interests and being able to identify 
 229.  See generally Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of 
Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 483 (2007). 
 230.  See generally Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the 
WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005). 
 231.  See e.g., Douglas Ierley, Defining the Factors that Influence Developing Country 
Compliance with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the 
Dispute Over Bananas, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 615, 616 (2002) (presenting the five principal 
factors cited by diplomats as influencing developing country participation in and compliance with 
WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions, including lack of economic power). 
 232.  Jayashree Watal, Developing Countries’ Interests in a “Development Round,” in THE 
WTO AFTER SEATTLE 71 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (explaining that for many decades, developing 
nations were not significant players in the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT); 
see generally Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 
317 (2006) (noting that due to globalization and the increasing interdependence of states, many 
modern problems cannot be solved in a purely consensual system and require formal international 
agreement, “rules that require strict compliance,” and mechanisms to influence the conduct of 
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which ones are implicated in any given issue is in and of itself helpful.  
The explicative power of the core interests can shed light on China’s 
motivations, especially when they are mixed.  Beyond the explicative 
value, understanding the core interests enables potential partners to 
frame issues in more attractive ways to appeal to, down-play, or avoid 
China’s interests, as appropriate to the situation.  By identifying the core 
interests, discussing how they are implicated in recent and long-standing 
controversies, and highlighting the role they play in trade disputes, this 
article lays the foundations for robust debate and future scholarship on 
the utility of the core interest analysis. 
VI. CONCLUSION
China will continue to be a dominant force in the global economy 
for the near future.  Therefore, it is imperative to understand the interests 
that drive China’s trade and foreign policies.  This article articulates 
three core interests that will dominate China’s decision-making for at 
least the next decade.  Appreciating the explicative, predictive, 
persuasive, and coalition-building values of the core interests will be 
indispensable in understanding China. 
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